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1. Introduction  
 
Institutional ownership of common stock has increased substantially over the past fifty years. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds report, institutions owned approximately 7 
percent of US equities in 1950, and their ownership increased to 51 percent by the end of 2004. Their 
increasing dominance in the equity markets contrasts with our limited understanding of the role 
institutional investors play in corporate governance.  In this paper, we examine institutional monitoring 
which consists of both information gathering and efforts to influence management. 
Theoretical work by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998) 
highlights the choice institutions face between exerting monitoring effort for shared gain versus simply 
trading for private gain.  That is, some institutions may only focus on information gathering and 
trading, choosing not to expend effort on influencing management.  Reflecting this outcome, empirical 
work has been mixed on the benefits of institutional ownership in a firm.  Researchers such as 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988), Agrawal and Mendelker (1990), Bushee (1998), Hartzell and Starks 
(2003), Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005), and Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman and Parrino (2006)  
have shown that certain types of, but not all, institutional investors exert influence on antitakeover 
amendments, R&D investment decisions and CEO compensation. However, Parrino, Sias and Starks 
(2003) conclude that rather than exerting effort to influence management, some institutional investors 
vote with their feet by selling their shares when they are dissatisfied with corporate performance 
(ahead of forced CEO turnover).  Two recent papers on mergers produce a mixed message as well.  
Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) conclude that institutional investors who have high turnover 
portfolios leave managers undisciplined in acquisition decisions. Qiu (2004) shows that public pension 
funds are associated with reduced frequency of bidding, but disagrees with Gaspar et al. about whether 
portfolio turnover has any effect.  The two studies come to different conclusions on merger 
performance. 
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In order to better understand institutional monitoring and the sometimes conflicting evidence, 
we study institutional investors within a framework of the costs and benefits of monitoring vis-à-vis 
trading (the “Wall Street Rule”). This framework produces the conclusion that the net benefits of 
monitoring increase in the size of the stake, the length of time invested  and the independence of the 
institution (we define independence as the absence of potential business ties in the same spirit as 
Brickley et al. (1988)).  We hypothesize that independent institutional investors that have maintained 
large stakes in a firm for at least one year (long-term) will specialize in monitoring activities, showing 
little short-term trading profit.  Other institutional investors may trade instead of monitoring.  Further, 
monitoring institutions will benefit through their monitoring efforts, but at least some of this benefit 
will be shared with other shareholders of the firm. Our paper is the first to simultaneously consider the 
type of institution, its stake and its length of time invested in a particular firm for institutional 
monitoring and trading. Further, ours is the first to empirically study whether long-term monitors enjoy 
private benefits through trading. 
We choose acquisitions as the setting for empirical tests of our hypotheses.  Aside from being 
visible large investments, it is well-established that acquisition decisions have the potential for wide 
disagreement between shareholder and manager interests.  We examine the degree to which 
independent long-term institutions (ILTIs) with large stakes mitigate this conflict.  Specifically, our 
hypotheses predict the following: total institutional holdings will have no or mixed predictive power 
for merger performance or bid withdrawal; concentrated holdings by ILTIs will be associated with 
better mergers and withdrawal of bad mergers; ILTIs with concentrated holdings will expend effort to 
have a bad bid withdrawn rather than selling their shares after the announcement; grey institutions (we 
define grey institutions as those whose monitoring abilities might be compromised due to business 
interests) or those invested for the short-term will not be associated with better merger performance or 
withdrawal of bad deals; ILTIs will show little evidence of short-term trading gains, but they will 
increase their holdings over time in better firms and decrease them only in advance of large, negative 
outcomes. 
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In our empirical analysis, we relate our measures of institutional presence to bid announcement 
returns, three-year buy-and-hold post-merger abnormal returns (BHAR), post-merger change in 
industry-adjusted return on assets (∆ROA) and post-merger changes in analyst earnings forecasts 
(∆EPS).  We find results broadly consistent with our predictions. Specifically, the presence of large 
holdings by ILTIs predicts better post-merger BHAR, ∆ROA and ∆EPS.  High total institutional 
holdings or large holdings by grey or short-term institutions do not predict post-merger performance.  
Similarly, firms with large ILTI holdings are less likely to announce the worst deals (mergers with 
announcement returns in the bottom quintile) than are firms with only large grey or short-term 
holdings.  Further, in the event that a firm does announce such a bid, it is more likely to withdraw the 
bid if it has large holdings by ILTIs, but not if it only has large grey or short-term holdings.   
Our examination of the trading activity of ILTIs with large holdings shows that they do not 
make beneficial portfolio adjustments immediately prior to a bid.  However, looking at the entire year 
prior to the bid announcement, we find that ILTIs do reduce their stakes in advance of the worst 
(bottom quintile) of acquisition announcements and increase their stakes in advance of acquisitions 
with positive announcement returns.  We interpret this evidence as implying that they benefit from the 
information generated through their monitoring efforts, but only through long-term portfolio 
adjustments, rather than by trading on event-specific knowledge.  The fact that they sell only prior to 
the worst acquisition decisions suggests a desire to monitor and influence rather than to sell a large 
position and walk away in all but the worst cases. 
In sub-period analysis, we find that institutions had a stronger monitoring presence in the 
second half of our sample period. While our inferences are similar for the 1984-1989 sub-period, the 
monitoring effects are stronger and more significant in the 1990-2001 sub-period. This is consistent 
with increased institutional shareholder activism beginning in the late 1980s. 
Institutional presence and acquisitions are both endogenous, suggesting an alternative 
hypothesis that institutions are good at picking and investing in better-managed firms, leading to the 
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observed relation without any active monitoring.  Under the assumption that all institutions have equal 
stock-picking ability, we would not expect the monitoring effect to be only observed for ILTIs with 
concentrated holdings. Further, even if we relax this assumption and assume that ILTIs specialize in 
identifying and staying invested in better-governed firms, we believe that the results on the likelihood 
of withdrawing bad deals suggest an active role of ILTIs in monitoring managers rather than a passive, 
stock-picking strategy.  We also find the fact that the strength of the monitoring effect increases in the 
1990s contemporaneously with a general increase in institutional activism suggestive of an active role.  
Finally, we conduct additional tests that increase our confidence in the monitoring hypothesis.  The 
effect remains if we control for firm performance and governance as determinants of institutional 
holdings, and the effect is strongest among institutions that would be expected to attempt to influence 
management most (public pension funds) and weakest among those that would put relatively more 
weight on information gathering and trading (investment companies).  Nonetheless, we cannot 
completely rule-out alternative explanations such as this. We discuss this and other potential 
explanations further in Section 6. 
Our overall assessment of the results is that independent institutions with large shareholdings 
and a long-term orientation clearly benefit from their efforts as monitors, as suggested by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) and Maug (1998), and confirmed by the superior post-merger performance of the firms 
in our sample. However, there is no evidence that they are able to, or attempt to, profit from strategic 
trading immediately surrounding the deal announcement.  Rather, their monitoring effort allows them 
to make favorable portfolio adjustments such as selling their stake in firms that are likely to make very 
bad decisions in the year leading up to the actual bids.  Thus, while most of the benefits of their 
monitoring efforts are shared by other investors in the firm, they do reap some private gain from their 
information. We reach the conclusion that, weighing the costs and benefits of trading versus 
monitoring, only ILTIs specialize in providing a monitoring role and that their efforts generate positive 
externalities to all shareholders of the bidding firm.   
   6
The plan of the paper is as follows. We develop our hypotheses and empirical predictions in the 
next section. Section 3 describes the merger sample and variables and provides descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results on institutional monitoring and interpretation, and Section 5 on 
trading around acquisitions by institutional investors. Section 6 discusses alternative explanations and 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions 
As discussed in the introduction, our study is closely related to the literature on direct intervention by 
institutional investors in corporate decisions such as CEO turnover, compensation and R&D 
investment. Other studies have looked for more general effects of institutional investors and have also 
found mixed results. Whereas Smith (1996) finds that CalPERS was successful in its performance 
targeting, other studies on larger samples of pension funds are more skeptical. Karpoff, Malatesta and 
Walkling (1996), Wahal (1996), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), and Gillan and Starks (2000) show 
some short-term market reaction to the announcement of shareholder activism. However, there is little 
evidence of improvement in long-term stock or operating performance resulting from activism.  
Conversely, Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian (2004) conclude that the presence of institutions 
without potential business relations with the firm is associated with better firm operating performance. 
In another strand of the literature, researchers have investigated the relation between firm value 
and institutional holdings. McConnell and Servaes (1990) detect a positive relation between Tobin’s Q 
and the fraction of shares owned by institutions. However, Woidtke (2002) shows that firm value is 
only positively related to ownership by private pension funds.  
 
Hypothesis Development 
All institutions face a cost-benefit analysis of monitoring versus trading. Here, by monitoring we mean 
both information gathering and efforts to influence management. This is distinguished from trading by 
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both the type of information gathered (long versus short-term) and the effort made to influence 
management rather than to simply trade on that information. The monitoring and trading roles are 
related.  As we argue below, an institution that chooses to monitor is taking an active role in 
governance, but a passive trading position.  Alternatively, institutions that choose not to monitor may 
be active traders, but are passive in firm governance.  In the following, we establish a framework of the 
costs and benefits of monitoring, from which we develop specific hypotheses.  
 
Costs of Monitoring 
We argue that monitoring costs decrease with the size of the institutional holding, the independence of 
the institution, and the length of time it has invested in the firm.  
As long as there is a fixed component to the cost of gathering and analyzing information on the 
invested firm, there will be economies of scale in monitoring technology.  The larger the holdings of 
an institution, the smaller will be the proportional cost of monitoring.  Further, larger holdings can 
actually reduce the total costs of monitoring by giving the institution easier access to management and 
the board. Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) show that institutions with large ownership positions 
often have access to board members and senior managers. 
Brickley et al. (1988) establish that some institutional investors (e.g., insurance companies and 
banks through their trust departments) have either existing or potential business relationships with 
firms, and, therefore, in order to protect those relationships they might be less willing to challenge 
management decisions. We will call these “grey” institutional investors.  In contrast, institutions such 
as investment companies, independent investment advisors and public pension funds do not seek 
business relationships with the firms in which they invest (we call these “independent” institutional 
investors). Grey institutions face high costs to monitoring because they could damage their relationship 
with firm management and lose existing or potential business. Thus, independent institutions without 
potential business ties face lower costs to monitoring.  
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Finally, the longer an institution has been invested in a firm, the better is its existing knowledge 
base about the firm and its managers and the better it becomes at processing new information about 
that firm.  Thus, institutions with long-term investments in a firm will have naturally lower cost 
functions for monitoring that particular firm.   
 
Benefits of Monitoring 
Monitoring benefits include the ability to influence management, the potential financial gain from the 
influence and better information. We argue that monitoring benefits increase with the size of the 
holding and the length of time invested. 
The longer an institution has been invested and the larger its stake in the firm, the more 
influence it will have with management.  Further, the larger is the stake the institution owns, the larger 
is the financial benefit to the institution from successfully influencing management.  The other product 
of monitoring is information.  Again, the longer the institution has been invested in the firm, the better 
is its information likely to be.  Information that leads it to buy additional shares will be of the same 
value regardless of the institution’s initial stake, but information that leads it to sell its investment to 
avoid a potential loss is more valuable the greater its stake.  Thus, institutions are more likely to benefit 
from their monitoring efforts through influence and information quality the longer they have been 
invested and the larger is their stake.  
 
Trading 
The costs of trading include direct transaction costs, price effects if the stake in the firm is large, 
suboptimal tax timing, and the costs of identifying and investing in a new firm.  Institutions benefit 
from trading only if they have superior information.  This information can be either specific to an event 
or action that management will take (short-term in nature), or general to the firm, its management and 
their receptiveness to institutional influence (long-term in nature).  The latter type of information is a 
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natural product of the monitoring efforts of institutions invested over the long-term. However, such 
efforts might not produce tradable short-term event-specific information. 
We have argued that the net benefits of monitoring are highest for ILTIs with large stakes.  
Further, the costs of selling increase in the size of the stake held in the firm and the length of time 
invested (due to lower cost bases).  Thus, as the length of time invested and the size of the stake 
increase, trading costs increase while monitoring costs decrease and benefits increase, such that the net 
benefits of monitoring will usually dominate those of trading for ILTIs with large stakes.  These 
institutions will specialize in monitoring, showing little short-term trading gains.   
Over time, as monitoring institutions gather general information about the firm, they will make 
beneficial adjustments to their portfolios based on such information.  On the buying side, ILTIs will 
increase their stakes in firms where their information is positive.  Because of the high costs of selling a 
large stake, the adjustments will be more discrete on the sell side; they will only sell if continuing to 
hold has the potential for a large loss. In contrast, long-term, grey institutions may compromise 
investment gain in return for more business with the firm, choosing not to sell in advance of poor 
outcomes, for example.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above arguments, we have the following hypotheses about institutional monitoring and 
trading: 
H1: ILTIs with large stakes will engage in monitoring and influencing efforts. 
 
H2: Grey institutions and institutions with small or short-term holdings will not engage in 
monitoring efforts (or such efforts will be unsuccessful). 
 
H3: ILTIs with large stakes will choose to exert effort to influence management rather than sell 
their stake after bad management decisions. 
 
H4: Through monitoring, ILTIs with large stakes will generate information that allows them to 
adjust their portfolios for private benefit. 
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Empirically, these hypotheses have the following predictions when applied to acquisitions: 
1. Total institutional holdings will have no or mixed predictive power for merger performance or 
bid withdrawal. 
2. Concentrated holdings by ILTIs will be associated with better mergers and the withdrawal of 
bad mergers.  
3. ILTIs with concentrated holdings will expend effort to get a bad bid withdrawn rather than sell 
their shares after the announcement.  
4. Institutions with small holdings, those invested for the short-term and grey institutions will not 
be associated with better merger performance or withdrawal of bad deals. 
5. ILTIs with large stakes will show little evidence of short-term trading gains.  However, they 
will increase their holdings over time in good firms and decrease them only in advance of large, 
negative outcomes. 
 
3. Sample Formation and Variable Construction 
We begin with all announced (both completed and cancelled) US mergers with announcement dates 
between January 1, 1984 and December 31, 2001 as identified by the Mergers and Acquisitions 
database of Securities Data Company (SDC) (11,043 deals). We identify all deals where the bidder is a 
public firm and it is coded as a stock swap, tender offer or tender/merger. We specifically exclude 
divestitures, repurchases or self-tenders, and deals that are only rumored. The above time frame is 
chosen because the information in SDC may not be reliable before 1984. We use 2001 as the base year 
to make CPI adjustments where appropriate. 
We require bidders to have available data from CRSP, and accounting information from 
Compustat (5,760 deals). To focus on deals that are large enough to have detectable performance and 
value effects on the bidder, we further require the size ratio of the transaction value relative to the 
equity market capitalization of the bidder at the quarter-end prior to the acquisition announcement to 
   11
be at least 5% (2,483 deals). Finally, we eliminate bids where the bidder is not covered in the 
CDA/Spectrum institutional holding database, resulting in a final sample of 2,150 bids.1   
 
Measures of Institutional Presence 
We consider three measures of concentrated holdings by institutions, all measured as of the quarter-
end prior to the deal announcement: ownership controlled by the five largest institutional investors 
(top5 holdings), ownership controlled by the single largest institutional investor (top1 holdings), and 
ownership controlled by blockholders (defined as holdings by institutions with at least 5% of the 
shares).  We further categorize these by length of holding: greater or less than one year, and by type of 
investor: independent or grey.  In the interests of space, we only present our results based on the first 
measure of concentration (top5 holdings), and note that all of our results are qualitatively unchanged if 
we use either of the other two measures.2 
Following Brickley et al. (1988), Cornett et al. (2004) and Almazan et al. (2005), we refine the 
CDA/Spectrum institutional classification into two groups according to the institution’s potential 
business ties with the invested firm. We group the CDA type 1 (banks) and type 2 (insurance 
companies) institutions into the grey investor group, and type 3 (investment companies) and type 4 
(independent investment advisors) institutions into the independent investor group. The CDA type 5 
institutions are a mix of ESOPs, university endowments, foundations, private and public pension 
funds.  Because this group has a combination of potentially independent and potentially grey 
institutions, based on earlier research on shareholder activism (e.g., Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)), 
                                                 
1 A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required that all institutions with greater than $100 
million of equity securities under discretionary management report their holdings quarterly using the SEC’s Form 13F; all 
common-stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed. These reports are available in electronic 
form back to 1980 from CDA/Spectrum, a firm hired by the SEC to process the Form 13F filings. We have also conducted 
all our analyses including these 300+ deals with no Spectrum data by assuming zero institutional holdings in the bidders, 
and found that these firms (due to either no institutional presence or lack of reporting) do not affect any of our main results, 
suggesting that they are not materially different from our sample of bidders with (nontrivial) institutional holdings. 
2 The cross-sectional correlation is 0.87 between top5 holdings and top1 holdings and 0.91 between top5 holdings and 
block holdings. The cross-sectional correlation is 0.72 between independent long-term top5 holdings and independent long-
term top1 holdings and 0.86 between independent long-term top5 holdings and independent long-term block holdings.   
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we manually identify and classify public pension funds into the independent investor group, and the 
remaining institutions in type 5 into the grey investor group.3, 4  
After identifying the five largest institutional investors in the bidder as of the quarter-end prior 
to the bid announcement (Q-1), we separate them into two groups: those who are independent and 
long-term, meaning that they remained in the top 5 for the year before the announcement (Q-5 through 
Q-1), and others. This classification identifies independent long-term investors on a firm-specific basis.  
Finally, since institutional investors tend to have a particular focus, we identify institution 
investors whose style is to be a long-term investor, lending themselves to a monitoring role. Bushee 
(1998) classifies institutions into three groups—dedicated, quasi-indexer and transient—based on their 
past investment patterns in the areas of portfolio turnover, diversification and momentum trading. 
While transient institutions are not expected to exert efforts to influence managers, dedicated 
institutions are likely to perform the full monitoring role of gathering information and attempting to 
influence managers. A priori it is uncertain whether quasi-indexers will attempt to perform monitoring 
functions. We refine our monitoring institutional presence measure by intersecting our groups of ILTIs 
with those identified as dedicated and quasi-indexer investors using Bushee’s method.5 Thus, our 
measure identifies the institutions whose style lends them to monitoring activities and who also have a 
long-enough relation with the acquiring firm to have the potential to influence managers.   
In sum, as of the quarter-end prior to the deal announcement, we aggregate the holdings by the 
independent, long-term, dedicated/quasi-indexer institutions among the top 5 in each bidder into Top5 
Holdings, Independent & Long-term and aggregate the holdings by other top 5 institutional investors 
into Top5 Holdings, Other.  
                                                 
3 Due to a mapping error by CDA/Spectrum, their type classification is not accurate beyond 1998. Many of the type 1 
to 4 institutions are improperly classified as type 5 institutions. We rely on the pre-1998 CDA classification of each 
particular institution and apply it to the institutional holding data in year 1998 and after. 
4 While endowments and foundations might be compromised by their desire to elicit donations from the company or its 
CEO, one could also argue that they are independent.  Despite the relatively small size of such types in the CDA/Spectrum 
universe, we checked the sensitivity of our results to their classification and it is worth noting that putting endowments and 
foundations into either grey or independent investor groups does not materially affect our results. 
5 We also intersect only the dedicated institution sample with our sample of ILTIs with concentrated holdings, and our 
inferences are unchanged.   
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Measures of Merger Performance 
We adopt a number of performance metrics to evaluate the monitoring role of institutional investors in 
corporate takeovers. The first measure is the bidder abnormal announcement period return over days 
(−1, 1), where day 0 is the date of initial bid announcement by the sample firm (CAR3). Daily 
abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model and the value-weighted CRSP index. The 
estimation window is days (−200, −60) prior to the acquisition announcement date.  
As a measure of deal quality perceived by institutional investors, CAR3 has advantages and 
disadvantages.  The advantages are that it is an immediate, market-based estimate of the wealth effect 
of the bid.  The disadvantages come from the noise in the stock price reaction stemming from the 
degree of anticipation of the deal, uncertainty over the final price and resolution of the deal, 
information about the standalone value of the bidder, and information asymmetry between managers 
and outside investors about the potential for value creation in the deal (Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and 
Noah (2005)).  In particular, if institutional investors are better-informed than marginal market 
participants, the difference between their perception of the quality of the deal and the quality implied 
by CAR3 may be important.  Thus, we complement the stock price reaction measure with post-merger 
long-run stock and operating performance. 
We control for size, book-to-market and pre-acquisition return in our long-run stock 
performance measure following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999).6 Specifically, each month, we sort the 
population of NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX firms into NYSE size deciles and then further partition the 
bottom decile into quintiles, producing 14 total size groups. We simultaneously sort firms into book-to-
market (B/M) deciles. After determining which of the 140 (14 size × 10 B/M) groups the bidding firm 
is in at the month-end prior to the deal completion, we choose from that group the control firm that is 
the closest match on prior year stock return and is not involved in any significant acquisition activity in 
the prior three years. Then, three-year buy-and-hold returns (starting from the month after merger 
                                                 
6 We note that using the calendar-time portfolio approach of Fama (1998) leads to qualitatively similar results. 
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completion) are calculated for the sample and control firms. Finally, the three-year buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are the difference between sample firm returns and corresponding contemporaneous 
control firm returns (BHAR).  
The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (EBIT/assets) is used as a measure 
of operating performance (ROA). The ROA may be affected by industry-wide factors. Therefore, the 
ROA variable is industry-adjusted by subtracting the median value of the same measure for all firms in 
the same primary 2-digit SIC industry as the bidding firm. We then estimate an AR(1) model using the 
post-merger industry-adjusted three-year average ROA as the left-hand-side variable, with the pre-
merger corresponding measure as the right-hand-side variable. The AR(1) model takes into account the 
possibility that pre-merger operating performance may predict post-merger operating performance. The 
residual from the above regression is our measure of the abnormal change in ROA (∆ROA).  We note 
that the overall inferences are unchanged if we simply use changes in the industry-adjusted ROA.   
Our final measure of the quality of the acquisition is the change in average analyst earnings 
forecast around the merger event. This is a useful measure because it potentially improves upon the 
operating performance benchmark by employing a different proxy for expectations about how the 
bidder would have fared without the acquisition. The change in earnings forecast (∆EPS) is calculated 
as the difference between the first average earnings forecast in the six-month period after merger 
completion (normalized by the stock price at the month-end after the merger consummation) and the 
last average forecast in the six-month period before merger announcement (normalized by the stock 
price at the month-end prior to the merger bid).  
 
Sample Overview 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the institutional presence in our sample of 2,150 bidding 
firms. We compute four measures of institutional holdings: total, top5, top1 and block. We observe a 
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strong surge in merger and acquisition activity in the latter part of the 1990s, coinciding with the rising 
bull market, and a subsequent decrease in activity at the end of the 1990s.  
There is a strong time trend in institutional presence in our sample, similar to what is observed 
for the population of CDA firms. On average, the top5 holdings are about half the size of the total 
institutional holdings in our bidding firms, and the top1 holdings are about one-sixth of the total 
institutional shareholdings. The fraction of firms having at least one institutional blockholder (%block) 
increases over time to greater than 70% by the end of the sample period. Of those bidding firms with 
institutional blockholders, the blockholdings are higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s (18% vs. 10%).    
Most of our analysis will focus on the 1,815 completed acquisitions in the sample. This 
subsample has marginally higher (38% versus 34% average) total institutional ownership and about 
one percentage point higher concentrated (top5, top1 or block) ownership than the sample of 
withdrawn mergers. This subsample is also more likely (57% versus 53%) to have a blockholder. 
 
4. Results on Institutional Monitoring 
We begin by demonstrating the difficulty of detecting institutional monitoring when all institutional 
ownership is treated equally. In table 2 we present our different measures of merger performance, 
broken-out by the total institutional ownership in the bidding firm prior to the bid.  The ability to 
influence management is akin to a threshold effect, such that some absolute level of holdings must be 
reached before influence is significant.  This suggests that our measure of “large” institutional holdings 
should be an absolute measure across all years, rather than being measured relative to holdings within 
a specific year. Thus, we assign firms to quintiles of institutional holdings based on the entire sample 
of holdings across all years.  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the inferences drawn from the paper 
are not changed if we sort within-year instead. The latter sorting controls for the time-trend in 
institutional holdings, but misses the important point of growing institutional influence over time. 
   16
Sias and Starks (1997) and Gompers and Metrick (2001), among others, document that 
institutional investors tend to invest in large companies (a fact we have confirmed for our sample).  
However, as Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) show, it is the small bidders that tend to create 
more wealth at the announcement of a bid.  Hence, sorting on institutional holdings without controlling 
for the size effect in institutional holdings will bias against finding support for institutional monitoring. 
We adopt a two-way size-and-holding sort to address the size issue.  
Table 2 reports our univariate comparison of total institutional holdings and performance of 
merger deals after controlling for the size effect. Three of the four measures show no significant 
difference between large and small total institutional holdings (and for CAR3 and BHAR, the 
difference is the opposite of what would be predicted by monitoring). Only post-merger ROA is larger 
for bidders with large total institutional holdings.  Our hypotheses posit that only concentrated 
holdings by ILTIs matter, so that using total holdings masks the variation in the true monitors.  In our 
subsequent analyses, we will break-out the holdings by this subgroup to test our hypotheses directly. 
 
Merger Performance 
In table 3 we present the results of estimating regression equations that control for firm size (natural 
log of bidder market capitalization at the end of Q-1) and many other characteristics previously found 
to be associated with merger performance: target public status (private, public, subsidiary), whether the 
acquisition is diversifying (target is outside of the bidder’s 2-digit SIC code), all equity or all cash 
payment, relative size of the acquisition (total value of consideration paid by the bidder, divided by the 
bidder’s equity market capitalization at the end of Q-1), bidder Tobin’s Q, bidder book leverage, and 
bidder profitability (operating cash flow scaled by assets).  We also include two variables to control for 
the possibility that public scrutiny of some firms provides sufficient monitoring that these firms make 
better acquisitions (regardless of institutional presence): a dummy variable identifying S&P 500 
membership and a variable counting the number of analysts following the firm. The regressions also 
include year and industry dummies.   
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In our hypothesis development, we predict that monitoring power is a threshold effect rather 
than a linear relation. Thus, we use dummy variables to identify concentrated holdings rather than 
imposing a linear relation between the level of concentrated holdings and monitoring effects.  We note 
that when we re-estimate the tests using continuous measures, we find that the inferences are virtually 
unchanged. Our variables of interest are: total institutional holdings and dummies identifying bidders 
that have concentrated holdings by ILTIs (Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term) and those that 
have concentrated holdings by other types of institutions (Top5 Dummy, Other). To produce the 
dummy variables for the regression, we sort each of our two measures of top5 holdings into quintiles. 
Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term is set equal to one if bidder holdings by independent, long-
term, dedicated/quasi-indexer institutional investors who are in the top 5 investors is in the largest 
quintile, and zero otherwise. Top5 Dummy, Other is set equal to one if the holdings by other top 5 
institutional investors in the bidder is in the largest quintile, and zero otherwise.7  We present four 
specifications, one for each of the four measures of merger performance.8   
The multivariate results confirm the conclusion that total institutional holdings are 
uninformative.  However, a different picture emerges for concentrated holdings by ILTIs.  All three 
post-merger performance variables are positive and strongly significant (announcement return is 
unrelated to institutional holdings). Concentrated holdings by ILTIs are associated with three-year buy-
and-hold returns that are 20 percentage points higher, post-merger change in ROA that is five 
percentage points higher, and change in EPS forecast of almost one percentage point higher. We also 
break out the three-year BHAR into each year separately and find that most of the superior long-term 
performance is achieved during the first year post-merger (not tabulated). Moreover, the results on the 
                                                 
7 As discussed earlier, we confirm our results for two other plausible measures of concentration (top1 and block).  The 
cross-sectional correlation is 0.61 between Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term and Top1 Dummy, Independent & 
Long-term and 0.70 between Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term and Block Dummy, Independent & Long-term. The 
mean aggregate holdings by independent long-term top 5, top1 and block institutional investors in the largest quintile (Top5 
(Top1, Block) Dummy, Independent & Long-term = 1) are 19.6%, 10.8% and 15.4%, respectively. 
8 It is plausible that institutional investors in the target firms also play similar monitoring role. In untabulated results, 
we found that controlling for the institutional ownership in the target (in the same way as we did for the bidder), has no 
material effect on our inferences. Further, including managerial equity ownership in the bidder does not change our main 
results. 
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S&P 500 membership and analyst coverage suggest that monitoring by investors, broadly defined, 
rather than specifically by these institutions, is not driving our results.   
None of the coefficients on Top5 Dummy, Other is significant in any of the performance 
regressions. F-tests confirm that the coefficients on Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term are 
significantly larger than those on Top5 Dummy, Other.  These results suggest that grey institutional 
investors that need to maintain and/or promote potential business relations with the bidding firm are 
compromised as monitors.  It also suggests that short-term investors do not make effective monitors.  
The results demonstrate the importance of accounting for institution type and length of holding when 
examining the effect of large investments.9  In untabulated regressions, we separately examine grey 
institutional investors and short-term institutional investors. We find that neither grey, nor short-term 
institutional investors show any evidence of monitoring, so that grouping them together as we do does 
not mask any important variation. 
The results support our first two hypotheses based on the costs and benefits of monitoring. The 
institutions with the lowest costs and greatest benefits from monitoring show evidence of doing so and 
other institutions do not. As predicted, total institutional ownership has no relation with merger 
performance and neither does concentrated ownership by grey or short-term institutional investors. 
Our third hypothesis predicts that ILTIs with large stakes will exert effort to influence 
managers rather than simply trade when outcomes are negative.  With respect to acquisition bids, we 
predicted that these institutions will exert influence to have bad deals withdrawn rather than sell their 
shares. To test this prediction, we examine the relationship between institutional holdings and deal 
completion.  
 
                                                 
9 One concern about our classification of institutional investors into grey and independent investors is that it is 
debatable whether mutual funds (investment companies, CDA type 3) are truly active monitors because some could argue 
that monitoring compromises their flexibility to trade in and out of stocks. To address this issue, we take out the CDA type 
3 investors from our group of independent institutional investors and analyze them separately (the other investors remain 
the same as before). We find that inclusion of mutual funds in the “independent” category does not drive the monitoring 
results.  
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Deal Completion 
The presence of monitoring ILTIs in the bidding firms exerts influence on deal completion through 
two mechanisms. First, a bad bid can be viewed as an outcome that arises due to a break-down in 
monitoring mechanisms. Thus, managers of firms with concentrated ILTI holdings should be less 
likely to propose bad deals. Second, monitoring ILTIs prevent bad bids from being completed. While 
we have previously argued that CAR3 may be an imperfect measure of the deal quality perceived by 
institutional investors in the bidder, we do not believe that they are completely insensitive to the stock 
price reaction to the bid. While information asymmetry between managers and shareholders could 
explain a negative reaction to a good bid, it is unlikely to explain a significantly large negative 
reaction.  Rather, as argued in Paul (2006), bids met with large negative reactions are likely to be truly 
bad bids.  Thus, if the stock price reaction is negative enough, independent long-term institutions with 
large investments would prefer to see the bid reversed. Table 4 presents evidence on both mechanisms. 
Panel A of table 4 tabulates the frequency of extremely high (top CAR3 quintile) and low 
(bottom CAR3 quintile) announcement returns in our sample, split by whether the bidder has 
concentrated holdings by ILTIs or other institutions. The panel shows that the presence of large ILTI 
holdings in bidding firms is associated with significantly fewer bad deals being announced, compared 
to the case where large ILTIs are absent, while the presence of large ILTI holdings in bidding firms is 
not associated with significantly more good deals being announced. In contrast, the presence of large 
short-term and grey institutional investors in bidding firms is not significantly associated with more 
(fewer) good (bad) merger deals being announced.  Moreover, the presence of large ILTI holdings in 
bidding firms is associated with significantly fewer bad deals being announced than is the presence of 
large short-term and grey institutions. Thus, the monitoring by ILTIs with concentrated holdings does 
reduce the chance of a bad bid being announced in the first place. Next, we examine what happens 
when preventative monitoring fails and management does announce a bad bid. 
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In panel B, we conduct a probit analysis where the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the announced deal is completed, and zero otherwise. The independent variables of 
interest are: the three-day bidder abnormal announcement period return (CAR3), our two measures of 
concentrated institutional presence, and the interaction terms of CAR3 and concentrated institutional 
presence. We present the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the likelihood of merger 
completion.10  The control variables are similar to those used in our multivariate analysis of merger 
performance.  The standalone Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term shows that these institutions 
are generally associated with a higher likelihood of deal completion.  This is consistent with our earlier 
monitoring findings and those in panel A because it suggests that on average, bidders with 
concentrated presence of these institutions are more careful to attempt deals that the managers believe 
will be met favorably by their investor base and completed. 
Moving to the test of whether these institutions intervene in bad deals, we find that the initial 
stock market reaction to the deal is irrelevant unless there is strong presence by ILTIs in the bidding 
firm.  Our results suggest that when there is such presence and the stock price reaction upon initial 
announcement is negative, then the bidding firm is under pressure to call off the deal.  For every 1% 
negative stock price reaction, the likelihood of withdrawal increases by 0.55%.  Given that the 
unconditional withdrawal frequency in our sample is only 16%, this is a large effect.  The pressure 
from ILTIs with large holdings to cancel a bad bid is great enough to offset their positive marginal 
completion effect.  For example, a stock price reaction of −7% would offset the positive effect of these 
institutions’ presence on deal completion (0.04 – (0.07*0.55) = 0).  This is not an inconsequential 
effect; Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) show that during our sample period, about 18% of all 
public deals produced an acquirer announcement return of –5% or worse (the announcement return for 
our bottom CAR3 quintile is –6% or worse). The coefficient on the interaction between Top5 Dummy, 
                                                 
10 Specifically, for each continuous explanatory variable, the marginal effect is obtained by taking the partial derivative 
of a Normal cumulative distribution function and evaluating both continuous/binary control variables at their sample 
averages. For each binary explanatory variable, the marginal effect is obtained as the difference between the likelihood of 
merger completion when the binary variable of interest is set to one and the same likelihood when the binary variable of 
interest is set to zero, and all other control variables taking their sample averages. 
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Other and CAR3 is insignificantly different from zero and significantly smaller than that on the 
interaction between Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term and CAR3. Finally, our proxies for 
public scrutiny are not significantly associated with the completion likelihood.  
In summary, we find that in terms of merger completion decision, monitoring effects are found 
when ILTIs have concentrated shareholdings. This is consistent with the earlier results on post-merger 
performance, which indicate that concentrated investments by the same type of institutions are a 
critical part of corporate governance mechanisms in the bidding firm.  Further, the results are helpful in 
distinguishing between active monitoring and the alternative explanation that institutions simply 
passively invest more in better firms.  The rise in bad-bid withdrawals suggests an active rather than a 
passive role by ILTIs.  
Our final hypothesis predicts that through monitoring, ILTIs with large holdings acquire 
information that allows them to trade for private gain in the long-run. In next section, we examine 
short-term and long-term institutional trading prior to and around the bid announcement. 
 
5. Results on Trading  
In this section, we ask whether institutions trade and when they trade relative to the bid announcement.  
There are several aspects of trading to consider. First is the “Wall Street Rule,” in which institutions 
sell rather than exert effort to influence management. Our results thus far demonstrate an observable 
monitoring and influencing effect, confined to ILTIs with large stakes. Here we test the prediction that 
these institutions focus on monitoring instead of short-term trading.  The second aspect of trading is 
that, through portfolio adjustments over time, it affords an opportunity for institutions to capture 
private gain from their information gathering efforts.   
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Short-term Trading 
We start by examining short-term trading in the quarter prior to the bid announcement (Q-1) and in the 
announcement quarter (Q0).  We estimate the following equation for the change in holdings in Q0 to 
test for a relation between our measures of bid quality and institutional trading in the quarter 
immediately surrounding the bid:  
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where the control variables follow Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Parrino et al. (2003) who study 
the determinants of (changes in) institutional holdings.  We include the contemporaneous and lagged 
returns for the bidding firm, firm size, firm book-to-market (both measured in Q-5), the 
contemporaneous and lagged share turnover, turnover from one year prior, an EOY (end-of-year) 
dummy, and the number of days between the deal announcement and the quarter-end. Turnover in a 
specific period is constructed by dividing the period-specific volume by the shares outstanding as of 
the end of the previous period.  Seasonal effects are handled by including turnover from one year prior 
and the end-of-year dummy (taking the value of one if the quarter being examined is the fourth 
quarter). Finally, we control for the timing of the deal within the quarter by including the number of 
days between the announcement day and the end of quarter. When we examine the change in 
institutional holdings in the quarter prior to the bid announcement, the timing of control variables are 
adjusted accordingly and we drop the days-to-end-of-quarter variable. 
The specification in equation (1) is a reverse-regression where we predict past change in 
holdings with merger performance measures on the right hand side.  The intuition behind the 
specification is that if institutions have superior knowledge about the quality of management or their 
ability to monitor management, then abnormal changes in their holdings will be explained by the ex-
post observed quality of the deal.  The control variables in equation (1) explain normal changes in 
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institutional holdings, so we can interpret a significant coefficient on ex post merger performance as 
evidence that institutions’ ex ante information about merger quality influences their trading decisions. 
As in our previous analysis, we make use of several merger performance measures: abnormal 
announcement period return, long-run returns (BHAR1 and BHAR),11 long-run operating performance, 
and analyst earnings forecast revision. To measure the change in shareholdings by different 
institutional investors in the bidder, we split the change in total institutional shareholding into trading 
by ILTIs that are in the top 5 investors and all other institutions.   
Panel A of table 5 presents the results for the quarter prior to the announcement (Q-1).  The 
panel shows no relation between measures of merger performance and ILTIs’ trading. To confirm that 
monitoring institutions choose influencing efforts over trading, we undertake a more detailed 
examination of the change in shareholdings by independent, long-term top 5 institutions in the 
announcement quarter (Q0). We do not find any significant correlation between their Q0 change in 
holdings and the announcement period abnormal return (CAR3) or other measures of post-merger 
performance.  Further, bidders with the greatest drop in independent, long-term top 5 institutional 
shareholdings in the announcement quarter are not associated with the worst CAR3.  Thus, ILTIs with 
concentrated holdings do not dump their shares following bad acquisition announcements. Instead, as 
shown in table 4 panel B, they exert effort to influence management to withdraw the bid.  This 
evidence also ensures that our probit results from that panel are not driven by reverse causality from 
institutional investors dumping their shares at the bid announcement and pushing the stock price down.   
Overall, the tests support our conjecture that independent, long-term investors with 
concentrated holdings find that the cost-benefit analysis for them favors monitoring rather than short-
term trading.  Further, the results for the other institutions suggest that any information advantage 
gained by these institutions is not so precise as to allow them to advantageously trade around a bid.  
                                                 
11 In light of our previous results that most of the superior long-term performance as a result of institutional monitoring 
is achieved during the first year post-merger, we tabulate both one-year (BHAR1) and three-year (BHAR) buy-and-hold 
returns in our analysis of institutional trading. 
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Next, we expand the trading window and examine the change in institutional holdings over the four 
quarters prior to the merger announcement (Q-4 to Q-1).  
 
Long-term Trading 
Panel B of table 5 presents the results from estimating the following regression using the change in 
institutional holdings over a one-year period: 
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where the control variables are analogously defined as in equation (1) but with a different time frame. 
Here, we do not argue that institutions have foreknowledge of the bid well in advance of its 
announcement. Rather, we argue that institutions gather information about the firm’s management that 
helps them assess whether this management is likely to make better or worse decisions in general. 
Institutions then make their portfolio adjustments accordingly, without foreknowledge of any specific 
corporate decision. We use the ex-post acquisition decision as a proxy for institutions’ assessment of 
management quality. 
We find that both announcement return and post-merger operating performance help explain 
pre-merger changes in the holdings of ILTIs.  Thus, the monitoring efforts of these institutions produce 
information that helps them choose whether to increase their holdings in a firm. The fact that we find 
evidence of long-term, but not short-term, effects suggests that their information is more general in 
nature, applying to the overall quality of management and to their private information about how 
receptive that management is to their influence.  Their trading on this information pays off when 
management makes investment decisions that are rewarded by the market with higher announcement 
returns. These announcement returns capitalize better long-run operating performance in these 
mergers.   
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We have argued that the costs of selling will be high relative to the net benefits of monitoring 
for ILTIs with large holdings. If, as the evidence in panel B suggests, their monitoring effort does 
produce information about the quality of management and their ability to influence it, then there will 
be times when they perceive low-quality management unwilling to listen to them.  In such cases, the 
cost of staying invested would outweigh the costs of selling.  As we hypothesized, they will trade out 
of a firm, but only if they perceive the potential for large value reduction by management. We test this 
hypothesis by allowing for asymmetry and/or non-linearity in our trading regressions.  Specifically, we 
split each merger performance measure into positive and negative realizations and include dummy 
variables identifying deals in the top and bottom performance quintiles.  Panel C of table 5 presents the 
results.  
ILTIs with large holdings do not respond symmetrically to positive and negative information 
about the firm.  While they will linearly increase their holdings as the information about the firm 
becomes more positive, their actions on the downside are quite different.  The regressions show no 
linear relation between changes in their holdings and information that is negative. However, the 
coefficient on the dummy variable capturing the bottom performance quintile is significantly negative, 
indicating that these institutions will sell, but only if the information is bad enough, suggesting a 
threshold effect in their selling decision. From a trading perspective, the stock-price based measures 
are the most important measures of deal quality.  The results show that when the announcement return 
or one-year buy-and-hold return is in the bottom quintile, ILTIs reduce their holdings in advance of the 
bid.  The results hold for the ROA bottom quintile dummy as well (note that the negative coefficient 
on the negative ROA variable indicates institutional holdings increase in advance of poor ROA, but the 
effect is small), suggesting that the stock-price measures are reflecting deteriorating operating 
performance.   
The results for other institutions (untabulated) continue to establish little relation between their 
trading activity and measures of merger performance. If anything, they appear to increase their 
holdings in advance of poorly-received bids.  We have also checked the short-term trading results 
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using the expanded specification and there continues to be no evidence of short-term trading by ILTIs 
with large stakes. 
In summary, we find no evidence of profitable short-term trading around bid announcements.  
Monitoring institutions adjust their holdings over time as their information about the firm warrants it. 
They only sell in advance of extremely poor bids. 
Together with the results from table 4, the analysis here presents a more complete picture of 
how ILTIs monitor, influence and trade.  Through their monitoring effort, these institutions generate 
information about the quality of management and their ability to influence that management.  This 
information is not event-specific, which would allow for profitable short-term trading. Rather, it 
provides them with input to make long-term adjustments to their holdings. While they focus their 
efforts on monitoring and influencing, they will reduce their stake in a firm if there is the potential for 
large value reduction.  Further, as shown in table 4 panel B, when they are surprised by a very bad 
decision, they exert pressure to have management reverse that decision.   
It is worth noting that the other, non-monitoring institutions do not show any superior trading 
skill either in the short-term or long-term around bid announcements.  Since our prior tests have shown 
that they do not have any monitoring influence on managers, they are attempting to gain through 
trading, but are not, on average succeeding. 
    
6. Evidence on Alternative Explanations  
While our results suggest that ILTIs with large stakes actively monitor management, we cannot 
completely rule-out the possibility that our results are due to endogeneity or other causes for a spurious 
correlation between good merger performance and concentrated ILTI holdings. The most likely 
alternative explanation is that institutions are good at picking and investing in better-managed firms, 
leading to the observed relation without any active monitoring.  Under the assumption that all 
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institutions have equal stock-picking ability, we would not expect the monitoring effect to be only 
observed for ILTIs with concentrated holdings. However, we can relax this assumption and assume 
that ILTIs specialize in identifying and staying invested in better-governed firms.  We believe that the 
results from table 4 panel B on deal withdrawal suggest an active role of ILTIs in monitoring managers 
rather than a passive, stock-picking strategy.  Further, we discuss results from additional tests below 
that increase our confidence in the monitoring hypothesis. Specifically, the strength of the monitoring 
effect increases in the 1990s contemporaneously with a general increase in institutional shareholder 
activism, the effect remains if we control for firm performance and governance as determinants of 
institutional holdings, and the effect is strongest among institutions that would be expected to attempt 
to influence management most (public pension funds) and weakest among those that would put 
relatively more weight on information gathering and trading (investment companies). 
 
Sample Sub-periods  
According to Kini, Kracaw and Mian (2004), the 1980s is marked by intense takeover activity, 
hostility, and less effective internal control mechanisms, while the 1990s is characterized by a less 
active takeover market but more involved alternative governance mechanisms. As a result, we separate 
our sample period into these two sub-periods and repeat our analyses. We find that institutional 
monitoring is more pronounced in the latter period when the overall environment is conducive to their 
influence. Specifically, in the 1990s, the effects of the presence of ILTIs with concentrated holdings on 
merger performance are: the three-year buy-and-hold return is 22% higher and the post-merger change 
in ROA is 5% higher than without their presence. In the 1980s, the respective effects are 15% and 3%. 
The F-tests show that these effects are significantly greater in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  
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Controlling for Firm Performance and Governance 
To address the concern that ILTIs simply invest in better quality firms, we carry out the following 
analysis. First, we estimate a regression of institutional shareholdings by independent, long-term top 5 
institutional investors on firm size, stock return, and the corporate governance index (G-score) first 
introduced in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). We find that firm size is the only consistently 
significant factor in institutions’ shareholding decision, and that the G-score has no effect at all.  These 
results do not suggest that ILTIs with concentrated holdings tend to systematically invest in better 
performing and/or better governed firms. Next, we use the abnormal level of institutional 
shareholdings, the residual of the above regression, in our multiple regressions of post-merger 
performance. The coefficient on the abnormal institutional shareholdings captures any monitoring role 
by institutions, rather than the superior performance of the bidding firm itself. We find that the 
presence of concentrated holdings by ILTIs, as captured by the ranking of the abnormal institutional 
shareholding measure, is positively and significantly associated with post-merger performance.  
Bushee, Carter and Gerakos (2004) show that institutions prefer to invest in firms with good board 
governance.  Better boards can be expected to make better acquisition decisions, consistent with our 
results. We cannot observe the board structure of our sample firms, so our G-score analysis provides 
only an indirect test of this explanation. 
 
Information Collection versus Efforts to Influence 
In our paper, we view monitoring as consisting of two elements: gathering information that can be 
used in institutional investors’ portfolio selection decisions, and using such information to actively 
affect firm policies benefiting all investors. It is highly plausible that some institutions favor one aspect 
of monitoring over another.  For example, investment companies and independent investment advisors 
may be more interested in information gathering and trading while public pension funds may be more 
interested in actively influencing firm decisions. We carry out additional investigation to see whether 
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we can further identify institutions that would focus more on one aspect of monitoring than the other.  
Indeed, we find some evidence that the CDA type 3 (investment companies) institutions show more 
evidence of informed trading, while public pension funds show more evidence of monitoring. The 
CDA type 4 (independent investment advisors) are in between, showing equally strong evidence of 
both.  
 
Holdings Aggregation 
Institutions aggregate their holdings across funds or managers and report only the aggregate holdings 
in their 13F forms. This complicates our analysis because these managers may not share information or 
coordinate effort, may not even share the same objectives of monitoring versus trading, and departing 
managers may not adequately pass-on firm-specific information to their successors. We note, however, 
that treating these fund companies as one investor most likely biases against our finding a monitoring 
effect to the extent that multiple funds within the same fund company take uncoordinated positions in a 
single firm. To evaluate whether such aggregation could be affecting our results, we rank the type 3 
institutions based on the number of funds within one fund company. The top 20 fund companies (e.g., 
Fidelity, Barclays Global Investors, Vanguard, Franklin Resources, etc.) on average have 40 individual 
funds within the fund company. After excluding the top 20, the rest of type 3 investors on average have 
six individual funds within the fund company. These top 20 type 3 investors count for 14.8% of total 
institutional holdings and 29.4% of total ILTI concentrated holdings.  We remove these twenty 
institutions from our measures of concentrated institutional holdings. The inferences remain 
unchanged. In doing so, our intention was not to eliminate the aggregation problem entirely (this 
would deplete the sample unacceptably), but to see if there is any change in the results that would 
suggest that the aggregation problem is a concern.   
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7. Discussion and Conclusion  
The results in our study depict a complete and intuitive picture of institutional monitoring 
versus trading: when monitoring benefits exceed costs, institutional investors will monitor rather than 
trade; and their monitoring activities offer them informational advantages that they can use to adjust 
their portfolios over time.   
Our evidence on the relation between institutional holdings and acquisition quality shows the 
following.  Only concentrated holdings by ILTIs have any relation with post-merger performance; total 
institutional holdings and concentrated holdings by other types of institutions show no monitoring 
effect.  Further, bid completion is sensitive to the market reaction to the bid announcement, but only in 
the presence of concentrated holdings by ILTIs.  Thus, these institutions are active in influencing 
management’s decision to reverse a bad decision.   
Finally, our examination of the trading activity of these independent, long-term monitoring 
institutions supports the hypothesis that they focus on monitoring and influencing, rather than trading 
for profit.  They show no evidence of profitable short-term trading around bids. Rather, they engage in 
long-term beneficial adjustments to their holdings.  Consistent with the hypothesis that the high costs 
of selling a large stake are part of the motivation to monitor, we find that ILTIs with large stakes only 
sell in advance of extremely poor bids. 
Thus, ILTIs with concentrated holdings monitor management and take action when they see a 
problem. They do not trade actively on short-term information. Once management has made a poor 
decision, they will attempt to have that decision reversed. Over time, if they anticipate a large enough 
value reduction, and/or they perceive their ability to influence management to be low, they will sell 
their stakes.  Overall, they gain from their monitoring efforts. The gain from effective monitoring is 
shared with other shareholders, while the gain from long-run portfolio adjustment is private.   
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Table 1 
Corporate Acquisitions and Institutional Ownership Over Time, 1984-2001 
 
The sample consists of 2,150 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2001. The bidders 
are listed in the Securities Data Company’s Mergers and Acquisitions database and have institutional holding data in the 
CDA/Spectrum database. Frequency gives the number of merger deals in each sample year. Total holding is the fraction of 
a company’s stock that is owned by institutional investors. Top5 holding is the share ownership controlled by the five 
largest institutional investors. Top1 holding is the share ownership controlled by the largest institutional investor. %Block 
gives the fraction of sample firms having at least one institutional blockholder (owning five percent or above). For those 
firms with at least one institutional blockholder, Block is the share ownership controlled by institutional blockholders. The 
institutional holding data is obtained at the quarter-end prior to the acquisition announcement. Sample means are reported 
for total, top5, top1 and block holdings. 
 
 
Year Frequency Total Top5 Top1 %Block Block 
       
1984 49 0.30 0.14 0.06 0.51 0.09 
1985 63 0.32 0.14 0.05 0.48 0.09 
1986 72 0.36 0.15 0.06 0.50 0.10 
1987 68 0.36 0.16 0.06 0.59 0.09 
1988 56 0.36 0.15 0.06 0.48 0.10 
1989 51 0.37 0.15 0.06 0.41 0.12 
1990 25 0.32 0.14 0.05 0.44 0.14 
1991 71 0.31 0.15 0.06 0.46 0.13 
1992 71 0.39 0.18 0.07 0.58 0.15 
1993 85 0.37 0.18 0.07 0.67 0.13 
1994 148 0.44 0.20 0.07 0.67 0.16 
1995 181 0.44 0.20 0.07 0.69 0.17 
1996 206 0.44 0.19 0.07 0.64 0.16 
1997 243 0.46 0.21 0.08 0.73 0.18 
1998 254 0.46 0.20 0.07 0.67 0.17 
1999 224 0.46 0.22 0.08 0.74 0.18 
2000 177 0.47 0.21 0.08 0.66 0.18 
2001 106 0.51 0.22 0.08 0.73 0.17 
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Table 2 
Total Institutional Ownership and Merger Performance: Univariate Results After Controlling for the Size Effect 
 
The sample consists of 1,815 completed acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2001. 
We sort all completed deals into quintiles based on bidder size as measured by market capitalization at the quarter-end prior 
to the merger announcement. Deals within each size quintile are then assigned into quintile classes based on total 
institutional ownership with the quintile breakpoints determined separately within each size quintile. We then recombine 
deals in the same institutional ownership quintiles across size classes. Cross-sectional averages are computed for firms in 
each institutional ownership quintile using various merger performance measures. We report the averages for the largest 
and smallest quintiles. CAR3 is the abnormal announcement period return over (−1, +1). BHAR is the three-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return using the size, book-to-market and pre-acquisition performance matched control as the benchmark. 
∆ROA is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of the post-merger three-year average of industry-adjusted ROA on 
the pre-merger corresponding measure. ∆EPS is calculated as the difference between the first average earnings forecast in 
the six-month period after merger completion (normalized by the stock price at the month-end after the merger 
consummation) and the last average forecast in the six-month period before merger announcement (normalized by the stock 
price at the month-end prior to the merger bid). The corresponding standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
 CAR3 BHAR ∆ROA ∆EPS 
  
Largest Institutional Holdings -0.006 
(0.096) 
-0.107 
(1.233) 
0.032 
(0.187) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
Smallest Institutional Holdings -0.000 
(0.097) 
-0.060 
(1.026) 
-0.004 
(0.278) 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
T-test of Differences in Mean -0.81 -0.55 1.80 1.35 
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Institutional Presence and Merger Performance 
 
The sample consists of 1,815 completed acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to 
December 31, 2001. CAR3 is the abnormal announcement period return over (−1, +1). BHAR is the three-
year buy-and-hold abnormal return using the size, book-to-market and pre-acquisition performance 
matched control as the benchmark. ∆ROA is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of the post-
merger three-year average of industry-adjusted ROA on the pre-merger corresponding measure. ∆EPS is 
calculated as the difference between the first average earnings forecast in the six-month period after merger 
completion (normalized by the stock price at the month-end after the merger consummation) and the last 
average forecast in the six-month period before merger announcement (normalized by the stock price at the 
month-end prior to the merger bid). All control variables are measured at the quarter-end prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term is set equal to one if bidder holdings 
by independent, long-term, dedicated/quasi-indexer institutional investors who are in the top 5 investors is 
in the largest quintile, and zero otherwise. Top5 Dummy, Other is set equal to one if the holdings by other 
top 5 institutional investors in the bidder is in the largest quintile, and zero otherwise. Firm Size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the bidder. Total holding is the fraction of 
a company’s stock that is owned by institutional investors.  Private, Public, Diversifying, All Equity and 
All Cash are dummy variables that take the value of one for acquisitions of private firms, of public firms, of 
firms in another two-digit SIC code than the acquirer, if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition and if 
only cash is used, respectively, and zero otherwise. Relative Size is the transaction value divided by the 
equity market capitalization of the bidder at the end of the quarter prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the bidder market value divided by the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of 
book value debt to market value of equity. Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is sales minus the cost of goods 
sold, sales and general administration expenses and working capital change. S&P 500 Membership is an 
indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder is part of the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Number of 
Analysts Following is the number of unique analysts making one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in the year 
prior to the bid. The corresponding p-value is reported in the parentheses below each coefficient. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 CAR3 BHAR ∆ROA ∆EPS 
     
Intercept -0.104 -0.016 0.218 -0.046 
 (0.268) (0.989) (0.278) (0.000) 
Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term  -0.001 0.214 0.055 0.006 
 (0.802) (0.034) (0.007) (0.009) 
Top5 Dummy, Other -0.003 0.075 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.636) (0.257) (0.237) (0.309) 
Firm Size -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.630) (0.377) (0.000) 
Total Holding  -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.810) (0.999) (0.973) (0.124) 
Private 0.028 -0.190 -0.112 0.001 
 (0.043) (0.282) (0.001) (0.820) 
Public -0.022 -0.107 -0.074 -0.004 
 (0.091) (0.532) (0.029) (0.405) 
Diversifying 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.000 
 (0.609) (0.878) (0.132) (0.906) 
All Equity -0.003 -0.113 0.016 -0.001 
 (0.559) (0.093) (0.200) (0.726) 
All Cash 0.025 0.035 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.748) (0.978) (0.810) 
Relative Size 0.015 -0.032 -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.589) (0.423) (0.054) 
Tobin's Q 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.955) (0.909) (0.882) (0.353) 
Leverage -0.022 0.262 0.074 -0.004 
 (0.172) (0.213) (0.083) (0.530) 
OCF/Assets 0.000 -0.021 -0.034 -0.016 
 (0.988) (0.910) (0.331) (0.005) 
S&P 500 Membership 0.008 0.111 0.016 -0.002 
 (0.299) (0.272) (0.148) (0.212) 
Number of Analysts Following 0.000 -0.006 -0.019 -0.002 
 (0.898) (0.891) (0.027) (0.339) 
     
Yr, Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value: H0: Independent & Long-term  ≤ Other 0.329 0.063 0.003 0.044 
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.021 0.034 0.126 
Number of Observations 1815 1792 1383 897 
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Table 4  
Institutional Presence and Merger Completion 
 
The sample consists of 2,150 acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 
2001.  
Panel A: Institutional Presence and Bid Announcement  
We sort the three-day announcement period abnormal returns (CAR3) into quintiles, and use the top and 
bottom quintiles to define good versus bad deals. We then compare the frequencies of good and bad deals 
across two sub-samples where Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term takes the value of 1 (firms with 
large ILTI stakes) versus where the dummy takes the value of 0 (firms without large ILTI stakes). For 
comparison, we also compare the frequencies of good and bad deals across two other sub-samples where 
Top5 Dummy, Other takes the value of 1 (firms with large stakes by other institutions) versus where the 
dummy takes the value of 0 (firms without large stakes by other institutions). Top5 Dummy, Independent 
& Long-term is set equal to one if bidder holdings by independent, long-term, dedicated/quasi-indexer 
institutional investors who are in the top 5 investors is in the largest quintile, and zero otherwise. Top5 
Dummy, Other is set equal to one if the holdings by other top 5 institutional investors in the bidder is in the 
largest quintile, and zero otherwise. The corresponding standard errors are in parentheses. The p-values 
associated with the hypotheses that the presence of large ILTI stakes (other large institutional stakes) in the 
bidding firms is significantly associated with the proportion of bad/good deals are presented, as are the p-
values testing the differences between the effect of large ILTI holdings presence and the effect of large 
other institutional holdings presence.  
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Proportion of 
Bad/Good Deals 
   
 Bad Deals 
(1) Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term = 1 430 0.169 
   
(2) Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term = 0 1,720 0.208 
   
   
p-value: H0: Dif. in prop. of bad deals ((1)-(2)) ≥ 0  0.042 
   
(3) Top5 Dummy, Other = 1 430 0.204 
   
(4) Top5 Dummy, Other = 0 1,720 0.199 
   
   
p-value: H0: Dif. in prop. of bad deals ((3)-(4)) ≥ 0  0.589 
   
p-value: H0: Effect of Independent & Long-term ((1)-(2)) ≥ Effect 
of Other ((3)-(4))  
 
0.083 
   
   
 Good Deals 
(5) Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term = 1 430 0.195 
   
(6) Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term = 0 1,720 0.201 
   
   
p-value: H0: Dif. in prop. of good deals ((5)-(6)) ≤ 0  0.615 
   
(7) Top5 Dummy, Other = 1 430 0.216 
   
(8) Top5 Dummy, Other = 0 1,720 0.196 
   
   
p-value: H0: Dif. in prop. of good deals ((7)-(8)) ≤ 0  0.184 
   
p-value: H0: Effect of Independent & Long-term ((5)-(6)) ≤  Effect 
of Other ((7)-(8)) 
 
0.804 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Probit Analysis of Institutional Presence and the Likelihood of Merger Completion 
The dependent variable is the completion dummy, which is set equal to one if the announced deal is 
eventually completed, and zero otherwise. All control variables are measured at the quarter-end prior to the 
acquisition announcement unless indicated otherwise. Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term is set equal 
to one if bidder holdings by independent, long-term, dedicated/quasi-indexer institutional investors who are 
in the top 5 investors is in the largest quintile, and zero otherwise. Top5 Dummy, Other is set equal to one 
if the holdings by other top 5 institutional investors in the bidder is in the largest quintile, and zero 
otherwise. CAR3 is the abnormal announcement period return over (−1, +1). Firm Size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the bidder. Total Holding is the fraction of a company’s 
stock that is owned by institutional investors. Private, Public, Diversifying, All Equity and All Cash are 
dummy variables that take the value of one for acquisitions of private firms, of public firms, of firms in 
another two-digit SIC code than the acquirer, if only equity is used to pay for the acquisition and if only 
cash is used, respectively, and zero otherwise. Relative Size is the transaction value divided by the equity 
market capitalization of the bidder at the end of the quarter prior to the acquisition announcement. Tobin’s 
Q is defined as the bidder market value divided by the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of book 
value debt to market value of equity. Operating Cash Flow (OCF) is sales minus the cost of goods sold, 
sales and general administration expenses and working capital change. S&P 500 membership is an 
indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder is part of the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Number of 
Analysts Following is the number of unique analysts making one-year-ahead earnings forecasts in the year 
prior to the bid. We present the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the likelihood of merger 
completion. The corresponding p-value is reported in the parentheses below each coefficient. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
 Completion  
Intercept 0.121 
  (0.475) 
Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term 0.040 
 (0.036) 
Top5 Dummy, Other 0.011 
 (0.292) 
CAR3 -0.104 
 (0.417) 
Top5 Dummy, Independent & Long-term × CAR3 0.545 
 (0.072) 
Top5 Dummy, Other × CAR3 0.260 
 (0.186) 
Firm Size 0.006 
 (0.413) 
Total Holding 0.021 
 (0.682) 
Private -0.012 
 (0.800) 
Public -0.089 
 (0.021) 
Diversifying -0.001 
 (0.936) 
All Equity -0.035 
 (0.020) 
All Cash -0.021 
 (0.379) 
Relative Size -0.118 
 (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q 0.007 
 (0.436) 
Leverage 0.025 
 (0.631) 
OCF/Assets -0.010 
 (0.851) 
S&P 500 Membership 0.028 
 (0.163) 
Number of Analysts Following -0.006 
 (0.550) 
Yr, Ind. Dummies Yes 
p-value: H0: Independent & Long-term × CAR3 ≤ Other × CAR3 0.086 
Pseudo R2 0.137 
Number of Observations 2150 
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Table 5 
Institutional Trading Around Acquisitions 
 
The sample consists of 1,815 completed acquisitions announced during the period January 1, 1984, to December 31, 2001. We regress the change in institutional 
holdings on the following control variables: measures of merger performance (CAR3, BHAR1, BHAR, ∆ROA, and ∆EPS), the contemporaneous and lagged returns, 
firm size, firm book-to-market, the contemporaneous and lagged share turnover, and measures of seasonal effects. CAR3 is the abnormal announcement period return 
over (−1, +1). BHAR1 (BHAR) is the one-year (three-year) buy-and-hold abnormal return using the size, book-to-market and pre-acquisition performance matched 
control as the benchmark. ∆ROA is the residual from a cross-sectional regression of the post-merger three-year average of industry-adjusted ROA on the pre-merger 
corresponding measure. ∆EPS is calculated as the difference between the first average earnings forecast in the six-month period after merger completion (normalized by 
the stock price at the month-end after the merger consummation) and the last average forecast in the six-month period before merger announcement (normalized by the 
stock price at the month-end prior to the merger bid). Turnover in a specific period is constructed by dividing the period-specific volume by the shares outstanding as of 
the end of the previous period. We vary both the type of institutional holdings whose change we are trying to explain (the dependent variable as reported in the column 
below) and the measure of merger performance (as reported in the row below).  Each of the dependent variables is regressed on five specifications that are identical 
except for the merger performance measure.  For parsimony, we suppress the coefficients on the control variables and tabulate only the coefficient on merger 
performance below. The corresponding p-value is reported in the parentheses below each coefficient. 
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Panel A: Short-run Changes in Holdings 
The change in institutional holdings over the quarter prior to the bid announcement (Q-1) is the dependent variable. To measure the change in shareholdings by different 
institutional investors in the bidder, we split the change in total institutional shareholdings into trading by the following two groups: independent, dedicated/quasi-
indexer institutional investors who are the five largest institutional investors at least since Q-5 (Top5, Independent & Long-term) and other institutional investors. We 
present the change in holding results for all, independent long-term top 5 and other institutional investors.  
 
 Dependent Variable is the Change During Q-1 in the Holdings of: 
 
Merger Performance 
All 
Institutional Investors 
Top5,  
Independent & Long-term  
Other  
Institutional Investors 
    
CAR3 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.378) (0.894) (0.739) 
    
BHAR1 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.859) (0.600) (0.593) 
    
BHAR 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.343) (0.321) (0.983) 
    
∆ROA  0.012 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.151) (0.180) (0.780) 
    
∆EPS 0.134 0.006 0.129 
 (0.171) (0.863) (0.163) 
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Panel B: Long-run Changes in Holdings 
The change in institutional holdings over the year prior to the bid announcement (Q-4 to Q-1) is the dependent variable. To measure the change in shareholdings by 
different institutional investors in the bidder, we split the change in total institutional shareholdings into trading by the following two groups: independent, 
dedicated/quasi-indexer institutional investors who are the five largest institutional investors at least since Q-5 (Top5, Independent & Long-term) and other institutional 
investors. We present the change in holding results for all, independent long-term top 5 and other institutional investors.  
 
 
 Dependent Variable is the Change over Q-4 to Q-1 in the Holdings of: 
 
Merger Performance 
All 
Institutional Investors 
Top5,  
Independent & Long-term  
Other  
Institutional Investors 
    
CAR3 -0.029 0.026 -0.052  
 (0.199) (0.064) (0.057) 
    
BHAR1 0.001 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.808) (0.109) (0.901) 
    
BHAR  -0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.864) (0.205) (0.459) 
    
∆ROA  0.025 0.035 0.011 
 (0.231) (0.010) (0.529) 
    
∆EPS 0.364 0.036 0.457 
 (0.219) (0.708) (0.186) 
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Panel C: Long-run Changes in Holdings: Selling versus Buying 
The change in institutional holdings over the year prior to the bid announcement (Q-4 to Q-1) is the dependent variable. In contrast to panels A and B, measures of 
merger performance are split into positive and negative realizations and include dummy variables identifying bids in the top and bottom performance quintiles to capture 
asymmetry and nonlinearity. Specifically, Positive takes the value of the corresponding performance measure if it is in the positive range, and zero otherwise. Negative 
is defined analogously. Top quintile is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the corresponding performance measure is in the top performance quintile, and 
zero otherwise. Bottom quintile is defined analogously. Due to space constraints, we only report the coefficients on these four performance measure variables and only 
for the change in holdings by independent, long-term, dedicated/quasi-indexer institutional investors with concentrated holdings.  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable is the Change over Q-4 to Q-1 in the Holdings of 
Independent Long-term Top 5 Institutional Investors 
     
Merger Performance Positive Negative Top Quintile Bottom Quintile 
     
CAR3 0.025 -0.024 -0.000 -0.014 
 (0.084) (0.576) (0.998) (0.021) 
     
BHAR1 0.017 -0.000 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.072) (0.964) (0.177) (0.074) 
     
BHAR 0.006 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.361) (0.478) (0.298) (0.486) 
     
∆ROA  0.063 -0.020 -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.006) (0.067) (0.129) (0.041) 
     
∆EPS 0.441 0.026 0.003 -0.007 
 (0.511) (0.786) (0.645) (0.124) 
 
 
 
